

---

# Europe, Tech and War


Renewing Europe's Economy for Better Growth and Security

## ECIPE Webinar

Oliver Coste

[EuropeTechandWar.com](http://EuropeTechandWar.com)

30 January 2025



# Agenda

---

A: Tech experiences

B: Disruptive Innovation, Cost of Failure

C: Profitability of tech investment

D: The Usual Suspects

E: Tech and War, Tech and Growth

F: Solutions within the European social model

# Tech experiences – large groups

---



Fixed to Mobile



Data Centers to Cloud



Metaverse to AI



# Innovation: Incremental vs Disruptive



**ChatGPT**

Incremental  
innovation

Disruptive  
innovation

**20%**  
of Projects Fail

**80%**  
of Projects Fail

# Cost of Failure: Europe vs Rest of the World



2 to 6 months  
of compensation

Low cost of failure

**x10**

24 to 48 months  
of compensation

High cost of failure




Total Costs of Failure include:


- Operational losses during social negotiation
- Severance pay
- Training, Reindustrialization...



# Europe: no leader in disruptive innovation




# Innovation in Europe: poor R&D in tech




# One tech project in large groups

Valuation of success or failure  
of an innovative project - US vs EU - m€





# Five tech projects in large groups, with 4 failures



High Failure  
Rate

x

High Cost of  
Failure


=

No  
profitability

=

No  
investment

# Causes for Innovation Deficit: the Usual Suspects



# Industrial Revolutions and Wars

---

## 1st Industrial Revolution

Steam engine

1800



*First Opium War*

*1839 – 1842*

*Steamships vs Junks*

## 2nd Industrial Revolution

Internal combustion engine

1900



*Second World War*

*1939 - 1945*

*Aircraft, tanks, aircraft carriers*

## 3rd Industrial Revolution

tech

2000



*Ukraine*

*2022*

*Precision missiles vs aircraft  
and tanks*

# US – China confrontation for world dominance

---

Europe is out of the race



Xi Jinping, May 2021

« Technological innovation has become the main battleground of the global playing field, and competition for tech dominance will grow unprecedentedly fierce.»



President Biden displaying a semiconductor. He has promised to sign the CHIPS bill.  
Doug Mills/The New York Times

Joe Biden, August 2022

\$280 bn «to counter China»  
Embargo on US semiconductors  
Prohibition of Huawei, Alibaba  
OpenAI vs DeepSeek

# ECB: declining relative productivity since 1995

Euro area started to lose competitiveness at the turn of the millennium


## Long-term developments in productivity per hour worked

Ratio of EA-4 to US



Source: Long-Term Productivity Database and ECB calculations.  
Notes: EA-4 is a weighted average of productivity developments in Germany, France, Italy and Spain.

Index: 1995 = 100



Source: Long-Term Productivity Database and ECB calculations.

16 February 2024

Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB  
Inauguration lecture, EMU Lab, European University Institute



# ECB: the root cause is in poor tech investment

Rising gap in IT-related capital stock between euro area and United States



Source: EUKLEMS.

Note: IT-related capital stock is the sum of computing equipment and computer software & databases for all NACE industries. See Schivardi, F. and Schmitz, T. (2020), "The IT Revolution and Southern Europe's Two Lost Decades", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, Vol. 18(5), pp. 2441–2486.

3

16 February 2024

Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB  
Inauguration lecture, EMU Lab, European University Institute

[www.ecb.europa.eu](http://www.ecb.europa.eu)


# Proposal within the European social model

---

**Proposal: Flexicurity only above ~50k euros / year (top 5% to 10%)**

Only highly educated and well-paid employees

Not the US social model! No revolution!



Scaling up startups to world leaders

Triggering R&D investments from 50 bn to 300 bn euros / y

Increasing tax revenues by 1000 bn euros / y



But need for:

- solid documentation - fund economic analysis (Foundation for the Economic Analysis of Disruptive Innovation)
- preparation of public opinions

# Let's do it!



Mario Draghi on 9/9/24:

*“EU companies face higher restructuring costs compared to their US peers, which places them in a position of huge disadvantage in highly innovative sectors”*



Ursula von der Leyen on 29/1/25

*The Commission will thus propose a 28th legal regime, which will simplify applicable rules and reduce the cost of failure, including any relevant aspects of corporate law, insolvency, labour and tax law.*



# Thank you!

# EuropeTechandWar.com

## Publications



## Contributions & Mentions



## Press (Selection)



FT on 9/24/24: "A paper by Oliver Coste and Yann Coatanlem, published by Bocconi University in Milan, makes another important and still broader point about regulation: new and dynamic companies have to be able to adjust their costs quickly in the light of market developments."


---

# Backup

# A. Europe's R&D gap is in tech



R&D per continent - 2022  
Sources: OECD and European Commission



## B. Tech experiences – startup companies

---

Clients



“Is it proven in the US?”

No hiring



Clients



“Let’s try!”

Hiring dedicated teams



# Restructuring costs 10x higher in Europe

**Restructuring Costs** includes severance pay, operational losses during negotiation, training, re-industrialization – in months of compensation




Cost: 18 to 49 months  
in Europe

Cost: 3 to 7 months  
in the U.S.


**X 10**

**Source:** Provisions for restructuring in public announcements and in financial reports, with assumptions on Europe's share of the workforce

# Failure costs choke the profitability of tech investments




# D: VC funds - cost of failure and exit strategy



Potential restructuring costs in case of failure have an impact on acquisition prices by large groups, therefore on exit prices for VC funds.

# D: VC funds - lower profitability in Europe




Predicted Gap due  
to cost of failure:  
4 points of IRR



# D: VC funds median IRR


Median IRR since inception by vintage year



Measured Gap  
1998 - 2018:  
5 points of IRR

IRR: Internal Rate of Return since inception per vintage year as per Pevara for European funds (800 funds) and Cambridge Associates for US funds (2500 funds)

# D: VC Funds investments: US = 3 x Europe



= 3 x



## D. Industrial Revolutions and Wars




The Economist, 15 August 2024

# A. Total R&D, governments and companies

Gross domestic spending on R&D Total, Million US dollars, 2000 – 2021

Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators




USA - \$710 bn

China - \$620 bn

EU - \$400 bn

# A. R&D in tech: Europe's fall over 15 years


Figure 10 : Évolution du poids mondial des groupes dans le numérique, selon leur pays d'origine, en %



# Europe is a laggard in tech


## Tech R&D

2022 - European Commission




# Tech leaders: Europe behind the USA and China


Leading tech investors - by R&D  
2022 - bn euros - European Commission



## C. Cost of failure for large groups



**Source:** authors' experience in large groups (Alcatel-Lucent, Siemens, Atos), confirmed by informal exchanges with other groups



**Source:** Public announcements and financial reports, with assumptions on Europe's share of the workforce

**Cost:** includes severance pay, operational losses during negotiation, training, re-industrialization – in months of yearly pay



# European unicorns – spring 2023




GP Bullhound, June 2023

# C. Impact : specialization of continents




USA - Leading investors in R&D  
European Commission - meuros - 2022



Tech

Europe - Leading investors in R&D  
European Commission - meuros - 2022



Automotive

Chemicals / Pharma



Aeronautics

Energy

# Investments into startups in Europe

**In 2023, the French Tech Ecosystem Did Not Manage to Maintain its Spot as Second European Hub. It's Now Behind Both the UK and Germany**

*Amount Raised Evolution (in €bn) in Major European Countries*




Source: Personal database aggregating data from Crunchbase, Dealroom & eCap.


Powered by Google Cloud & 

Eurazeo, 2023 – the State of the French Ecosystem

## B. Impact on Large Groups: US specialization in tech...




# ...Europe's specialization in 2<sup>nd</sup> industrial revolution



# China's specialization: tech


China - Leading investors in R&D  
European Commission - meuros - 2022






# German specialization: 2<sup>nd</sup> industrial revolution

Germany- leading investors in R&D  
European Commission - meuros - 2022



# French specialization: 2<sup>nd</sup> industrial revolution


France - Leading investors in R&D  
European Commission - meuros - 2022





# The Japanese specialization


Japan - Leading investors in R&D  
European Commission - meuros - 2022



# Fragmentation of the European market? (1/2)

---

Is the fragmentation of the European market a major cause for Europe's lag in tech?




**Yes for tech applications**, namely on regulated markets like finance, healthcare, transportation

# Fragmentation of the European market? (2/2)

---

Much less clear of deep tech, like semiconductor, software, OS, cloud, AI, telecoms, quantum computing... where the market is mostly the world



The tech markets are often worldwide, and not country specific

---

# Industrial policies? (1/2)

1960 – 1970 in France : « Industrial policies»

Technological catch-up on US innovation



Concorde



High Speed Train



Nuclear Power Plants

1990 – 2000 in China : « Industrial policies »

Technological catch-up on Western innovation



High Speed Train



Nuclear Power Plants



Smartphones

# Industrial policies? (2/2)

---

## Possible Success

- For technology catch-up  
(e.g. semiconductor)
- With a large enough market  
(e.g. Europe)
- With legitimate political authority  
(e.g. national governments)


## Probable failure

- For disruptive innovation  
(e.g. the unforeseeable)
- With a too small market  
(e.g. France)
- With insufficient political authority  
(e.g. EU institutions?)


# Disruptive vs Incremental innovation




*Disruptive innovation*



Global market shares held by smartphones Nokia 2007-2017, Apple 2009-2017, Samsung 2009-2017 Source: Statista.com/statistics



*Disruptive innovation*



*Incremental innovation*



# Innovation at GAFAM: 1 success for 5 projects

amazon

Google

Microsoft

*Success*



*Failures*



# Cost of failure and tech decline

Where can a failing project be closed?



Share of world Tech R&D


Growing 

Declining 





# Google employees



If Europe was as attractive as the US, Google would have 7 x more employees there

# Innovation is possible within the Europe social model

US



~~Unemployment benefits~~

~~Health coverage~~

~~Free education~~

~~Pension systems~~

~~Employment Protection~~

~~Laws~~

Ger - Fr – It - NL – B – Sw



Unemployment benefits

Health coverage

Free education

Pension systems

Employment Protection

Laws



European Social Model

1880 - 1950

First oil crisis

Schmidt Giscard – 1975


# Academic Literature

Many Academic Papers Confirm that EPL is a First Order Factor in Europe's Lack of Investment in Disruptive Innovation (although usually based on Limited EPL Information, such as OECD High Level Indicators), in particular:

- Bartelsman, E., Gautier, P., & Wind, J. D. (2016). Employment Protection, Technology Choice, and Worker Allocation. *International Economic Review*.
- Berdugo, B., & Hadad, S. (2008). How Do Firing Costs Affect Innovation and Growth When Workers' Ability Is Unknown? Employment Protection as a Burden on a Firm's Screening Process. *The European Journal of Comparative Economics*.
- Bozkaya, A., & Kerr, W. (2014). Labor Regulations and European Venture Capital. *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy*.
- Cette, G., & Lopez, J. (2018). Employment Protection Legislation Impacts on Capital and Skills Composition. *Economie and Statistics, INSEE*.
- Griffith, R., & Macartney, G. (2014). Employment Protection Legislation, Multinational Firms, and Innovation. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*.
- McGowan, M. A., Andrews, D., Criscuolo, C., & Nicoletti, G. (2015). *The Future of Productivity. OECD (Section 4.3)*
- Saint-Paul, G. (2002). Employment protection, international specialization, and innovation. *European Economic Review*, 375-395.
- Samaniego, R. (2006). Employment protection and high-tech aversion. *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 224-241.

Question: How do we Confirm our Diagnosis on a Large Scale, so that we can move to a more operational stage?

The Goal is to Compare Restructuring Costs to Average Compensation and to Document Homogeneously Cost of Failure in Terms of Months of Employee Compensation



# Authors Bios

---

**Yann Coatanlem** is an economist and entrepreneur.

A co-founder of GlassView, the inventors of [Neuro-Powered Media™](#), he was previously head of several research departments at Salomon Brothers and Citigroup. He is currently the Chief Executive Officer of DataCore Innovations LLC, a Fin Tech start-up specialized in “antifragile” investment strategies.

Member of the board of the Paris School of Economics, he is the co-author of “[Capitalism against Inequalities](#)” (PUF, 2022), that received the “Prix Turgot” in 2023 and the “Prix Louis Marin” of the French Academy for Social Sciences (“*l’Académie des sciences morales et politiques*”). In 2018, he received from the same Academy the Special Prize of the Political Economy, Statistics and Finance section for his book “The government of citizens” (PUF, 2017), as well as for the work he has accomplished at the Club Praxis, the think tank of which he is president, and that promotes the use of Big Data in policy making, in particular in [revamping the tax and welfare system](#).

Yann Coatanlem was part of a [Commission of economists](#) appointed in 2016 by the “*Académie des sciences morales et politiques*”, along with Olivier Blanchard and Thomas Philippon, to make recommendations on the teaching of Economics in High School. He is also a French Trade Advisor and head of an economic mission on France attractiveness in collaboration with Business France and the French Embassies in the United States, Canada and Mexico.

He graduated from ENSIMAG and HEC Paris. He is a recipient of the French National Order of Merit and of the Gold Medal of *La Renaissance Française*.

More at [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yann\\_Coatanlem](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yann_Coatanlem)

**Olivier Coste** is an entrepreneur and a corporate executive of the tech industry.

After working at the European Commission (DG Competition, then Cabinet of Commissioner de Silguy), he served as industrial advisor to the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, where contributed to the launch of Airbus as a company. He worked for Alcatel-Lucent where he managed several activities with European or worldwide presence and created a mobile television business which acquired customers in Europe, the USA and India. He co-founded and managed a video chat startup for e-commerce, which was adopted by Microsoft and IBM in the USA and by SoftBank in Japan. He led an Atos division in the US. Throughout all these experiences, he had to cope with both rapid growth and rapid decline of tech activities on both sides of the Atlantic.

He has lived in New York since 2014. He published “Europe, Tech and War” and “L’Europe, la Tech et la Guerre” (Amazon, 2022), that won the Strasser Prize by France’s Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, “Tech : quand l’Europe s’éveillera” in Commentaire in December 2023, and “La double surprise des telecoms” in Commentaire in Spring 2012.

He graduated from Ecole Polytechnique and Corps des Mines.

More at <https://www.linkedin.com/in/olivercoste/>