A First 100 Days for UK Trade Policy

Within a matter of months, the UK will almost certainly have a new government. As much as a change of direction will be a new energy as seen in 1997 and 2010, the last times this happened. A welcome new sense of possibility after time in office wore down the previous administration.

Though customary to talk of a first 100 days, trade policy does not usually lend itself to dramatic changes. Indeed, usually the opposite, as countries seek consistent positions given negotiations continue across changes of government.

A UK context of widely perceived trade policy failures in particular the ‘Global Britain’ agenda means this time there is a need for new direction. Reflecting changing world trade circumstances is also required. Removing what has been described as the ‘almost obsessive secrecy’ placed around UK trade policy and greater emphasis on economic security are two examples of what is needed.

What can’t be achieved immediately is renewed economic growth – problematically no single government action can immediately shift that dial in today’s complex economies. Chasing specific agreements is in particular not credible given their likely modest impact would be further limited by concessions needed for quick conclusion.

Early government actions must instead focus on better long-term foundations, which means identifying the shape of UK trade policy and how working with partners domestic and international can best deliver this. Proposals outlined below thus build on our March 2023 Paper, “Building a Mature Trade Policy”:

1. Bring full responsibility for EU Trade Policy into the Department for Business and Trade – ending the damaging post-2016 split given that so many trade policy choices depend on our EU. This should be accompanied with a revamped Cabinet Office structure for EU and global affairs, something that has been notably weak since 2016. Bringing together negotiations with Switzerland, Turkey and the EU will for example mean a coherent approach on the possibilities of regulatory alignment and joining the Pan-Euro-Med convention on Rules of Origin.
2. Announce intent to join the WTO Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) – as an indication of the importance the UK government will attach to global trade rules. This has been supported by trade specialists across the political spectrum, and the reasons for failing to join to date have never been satisfactorily explained, with the most likely explanation of trying to be nice to the US hardly satisfactory as the basis for such a decision.
3. Examine and enhance export growth plans for key markets, sectors, and SMEs – tasking responsible teams for major UK export markets with setting targets, identifying bottlenecks in support, and publishing regular updates on progress. Review priority market access barriers and ensure plans in place to tackle those having a significant impact on UK exports. Identify priority markets for senior official and ministerial visits on this basis.
4. Commission revamped Board of Trade to report on FTA implementation and opportunities for improvement – implementing effectively existing trade agreements has been neglected as an opportunity to date. Having previously made the commitment of an independent trade advisory body upon the Swedish model, giving it this remit immediately would bring energy to the task. Formalising the Board of Trade could follow at later date when legislative time was available.
5. Start an economic security dialogue with other mid-sized countries – focusing on how to balance this with respect for global trade rules, and how to best influence the three trade policy giants, USA, EU, and China. Countries invited could for example include Japan, Canada, South Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, New Zealand and Australia. Over time it may be possible to build towards agreement on how these issues can be better handled in multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral settings.
6. Implement greater transparency to better support UK trade policy – negotiating is a team game in which UK performance has been seriously undermined by secrecy. Many stakeholders are in regular contact with other countries, and removing requirements for participants in stakeholder meetings to have signed Non-Disclosure Agreements will help create “Team UK”. A reconstituted advisory group of genuine experts working in business, academia, civil society, devolved governments would help, and could identify the content that is truly confidential.
7. Review existing Free Trade Agreements and other negotiations – examining objectives and progress, with a view to prioritising some, potentially dropping others if unlikely to deliver sufficient results, and linking in particular those in the European neighbourhood. Identify opportunities for new mini-deals such as in digital trade or for mutual recognition.
8. Ensure approach to regulations considers trade and investment impacts – promoting an overall approach of alignment with major trading partners, and consideration of whether particular changes will create new barriers to participation in supply chains, or cause issues between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Monitor also the impact of any proposed changes on existing agreements whether FTAs or Mutual Recognition / Adequacy for example the data arrangements we have with the EU and others.
9. Commit to proper Parliamentary scrutiny of trade policy – including a final vote on all new or significantly amended Free Trade Agreements (e.g. if China was to join CPTPP), debate on negotiating objectives for new FTAs, more detailed updates given to Parliamentary committees, and an annual report on implementation. Establish revamped arrangements for consultation with devolved administrations to recognise their importance. This could be achieved via a Command Paper presented to Parliament.
10. Launch nationwide trade strategy consultation – emphasising the need for the UK to have a modern multi-functional trade policy whose objectives are economic but also include alignment with industrial strategy, net-zero, fair trade for consumers and workers, and the importance of both services and goods. Commit to ministerial and official engagement around the country in support of a revised approach, and ensure that this comprehensive view of trade is also reflected in training for officials.

There is no single secret to trade policy success, rather there is a need for government working with stakeholders to create the right environment in which policy goals can be pursued. Leadership must come from government, but much of the content from those with direct policy interest. As such, avoiding current levels of hyperbole will show understanding that success lies not in single game-changing moments, rather it is a steady flow of engagement within an overall sense of purpose.

If that seems to make trade policy unglamorous then this is accurate and more reason why the first 100 days must be taken seriously as really the only time a completely new direction can be imparted. Global Britain defined as lots of game changing Free Trade Agreements was never convincing, and the new UK government needs to identify a better way starting in those early days.