This Is What the UK Wants From an EU Reset (But What Will It Offer, and What Does the EU Want?)

With Keir Starmer and Ursula von der Leyen agreeing regular future summits and joint working by officials to prepare them, the first stage of the UK-EU reset is completed successfully. Despite considerable negative chatter around the process including inside governments, this always looked achievable given some high-level political push in the EU, smiles from the new UK government, and a realistic target that our papers and others had suggested.

That however was the easy part. While one can easily ignore the same tired voices on both sides suggesting there really isn’t any point to resetting – as if a €1 trillion trade relationship also vital for security should be ignored – a growing chorus is asking whether the UK really knows what it wants. As we shall see, this is the wrong question, since what the EU would like to know is more specifically what the UK doesn’t want or won’t offer, and we actually know far less about the EU’s position as a new Commission is formed.

What is then also pertinent is why the wrong question is being asked and what this tells us about the negotiation to come, both of which lead to greater concern. In short, that the reset is going to be uncomfortable for significant players on both sides required do things differently if this is to progress, and not far under the surface splits are starting to appear.

Looking first at the UK, there are some very bad habits that have been persistent in international engagement since 2016. One is for government thinking that saying what it wants explicitly is dangerous to the chances of negotiating success, related is the failure to develop a realistic narrative, and both have been compounded by taking lines from the other party literally. Hence anonymous sources from across the EU quoted as wanting to know what the UK wants from a reset cause panic.

Actually, everyone following the reset knows broadly what the UK wants. That is everything it can get to deepen the trade and security relationship short of the known red lines of no customs union, single market, or freedom of movement. This would be a veterinary agreement, regulatory alignment in goods, some mutual recognition of professional qualifications and conformity assessment, joining the pan-Euro-Med convention on rules of origin, emissions trading scheme linkage, a security deal, and better cooperation on global and neighbourhood economic issues.

All of this is known because a broadly similar list has appeared so often pushed by those with strong Labour Party ties. Much of it has been called for by the Labour Movement for Europe led by Stella Creasy MP, which includes over 100 MPs, and whose recent events have included speeches by the responsible government minister Nick Thomas-Symonds. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Hilary Benn previously co-chaired the UK Trade and Business Commission whose blueprint called for much of this. There’s an independent Commission on UK-EU relations with similar connections, Government ministers up to the Chancellor have speculated on much of this, and a Bill has been introduced to Parliament allowing the UK to align with EU product rules.

In turn the reason for these similar asks is because this is what the majority of UK businesses, trade unions, and civil society groups are pushing. These are key stakeholders for this Labour government, just as growth is a key driver, and all of this points to a maximalist agenda albeit slightly hidden by a fear of leave voters as well as the aforementioned rather strange approach to negotiations. Obviously, they need to define another level of detail as there are differences and decisions to be made, but that can reasonably be assumed to be happening right now, if perhaps haphazardly.

What we don’t know is what the UK government will offer in return and that is the best explanation of persistent EU questioning. Not taking the question literally, there is a strong case for Brussels asking that given in the past the answer has been very little. Even more so given the weak response so far to known EU asks such as on youth mobility or fish. Given the UK government hasn’t even accepted the need to be thinking about these issues – this is where a narrative would be helpful – there may also be an element of nudging the UK to simply be better negotiators.

A different explanation for the EU adopting a simple single question to the UK reflects that there isn’t in fact a settled opinion as yet in Brussels and across Member States. For some individuals, Labour’s red lines make the conversation insufficiently worthwhile and there isn’t a reset, others scarred by the last few years may be poking sceptically at London’s weaknesses while doubting the UK can move on. Most of all though, asking about UK objectives for the reset distract attention from the EU’s lack of a plan or clear objectives.

For in difficult times globally, the EU’s second largest trading partner is offering to deepen its relationship, and regardless of the divorce the bloc doesn’t know if this is of interest or not. Contrary to the most negative voices, the EU has interests with the UK, it wants to reduce SPS checks into the UK, maintain fisheries access, build resilience, enhance security cooperation, ensure regulatory alignment, improve mobility into the UK, and deal with specific Member State requests. Just as for the UK, this should be a sufficiently substantive agenda to make talks worthwhile – but there is a big trust deficit hence why implementation is also often mentioned.

At the very least, there is a good excuse for undeveloped EU thinking, which is waiting until a new Commission is in place and seeks a relevant mandate, which means early 2026 at best. This process will require consensus which as of now is elusive. There are friends and enemies of the UK in Brussels, and across Member States. Again, hence the question, if not taken literally, might actually be as to whether the UK can offer its Brussels supporters help in converting sceptics.

To be fair all round, how this is happening is a new experience. Previously there was an antagonistic divorce in a single negotiation of suspicion, now we are talking about trying to find a new relationship. There is an inevitable tendency to be suspicious, to fall back on bad ways, not least when there are differing opinions. Governments need support in finding new pathways against a backdrop of tremendous scrutiny. This is not going to be easy.

Mean time, there are those on both sides playing the usual games of negotiations, often with their own personal interests in facilitation or delay, finding as ever plenty in the media who will take their words at face value rather than as part of a probably messy process. Such is the process of 21^st century international talks, of which Brussels is usually aware and London often stunningly naïve.

What will ideally happen is a little less caution all round, and rather more joint working by stakeholders in the EU and UK to show governments the easiest avenues. For just as joint scoping was the obvious outcome of the first phase of the reset, what is needed in the coming months is agreement of a programme of talks for the coming years which will have broad support, and some of which in terms of enhanced cooperation will be relatively easy and build stronger foundations.

In some form this will probably happen, for the forces that want to see a successful reset, whether political or geographic, still have enough power to overcome both direct opponents and the more difficult factor of sheer bureaucratic inertia. What we are reminded though from demands for detail from the UK is just how much could go wrong, because words taken the wrong way can easily lead to defensiveness and increased hostility. Just as with other major relationships around the world, US-EU, or US-Canada, there will always be activity and issues, and it can never be considered settled.

All then is still up for grabs. Apart from what the UK government wants from an EU reset, which is known.